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THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
IN FEDERAL TAX CASES
RICHARD DEY. MANNING*
More than thirty years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes made the oft-quoted
statement that "Men must turn square corners when they deal with the
Government."' Some ten years later, Circuit Judge McDermott coupled
with this the statement that "The Government ought to turn square cor-
ners when dealing with its citizens."'2 At first blush, one would be in-
dined to agree as wholeheartedly with the latter statement as with the
former. However, in cases where a taxpayer has been misled to his
disadvantage by representations of, or actions by, agents of the govern-
ment, the vast majority of decisions have refused to hold the government
to the "square corners" envisioned by Judge McDermott.
The recent case of Stockstrom v. Commissioner,3 decided by the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, is of great importance
in this field. For in this case, the court went "against the tide" of the
majority and applied a doctrine which has been loosely termed "quasi
estoppel," to bind the government to an erroneous interpretation of a
statute which had been made to a taxpayer by agents of the govern-
ment. The taxpayer had made gifts to certain trusts in 1938 and in
the two previous years. Relying upon opinions of two courts of appeal,
the Treasury Regulations, past treatment of the same type transaction,
and representations of a high Bureau official, he did not file a gift tax
return for 1938. Ten years later, the Supreme Court passed upon this
question, and the effect of the opinion was to make such gifts subject
to the gift tax. The Commissioner then reversed his former position
and assessed the taxpayer for the tax on the 1938 gifts. Taxpayer
defended on the ground that his failure to file a return was based upon
the action of the government agents; that had he filed a return in 1938,
* Associate Editor, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.
'Rock Island, A. & L. R.R. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143 (1920).
- Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F. 2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1930). This thought has
been rephrased: "If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, 'Men must turn square
comers when they deal with the Government,' it is hard to see why the govern-
ment should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing
with its citizens." Maguire and Zimet, Hobsons Choice and Similar Practices in
Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1299 (1935).
'190 F. 2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1951), briefly commented upon in 14 GA. B. J. 106,
and 37 VA. L. REV. 1015. Certiorari is not contemplated. CCH 1952 FED. EsT.
& GIFT TAX REP. 9500.
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the present action would be barred by the statute of limitations; there-
fore, he argued, the Commissioner should not now be heard to assert this
claim. The court so held, reversing a judgment for the Commissioner.
4
The decision of the court in this case raises again the question of
whether the doctrine of estoppel is properly applicable to the govern-
ment in a tax case, and if it is, under what circumstances it should be
applied. The term "estoppel" as used in most tax cases does not mean,
in the strict sense, estoppel in pais.? Rather, it is a modified concept
sometimes referred to as "equitable estoppel" or "quasi estoppel."6 As
the field of federal taxation is a most fertile one for misstatements and
misapplications of the law, made by agents of the government and
relied upon by citizens, it is not surprising that there are a large number
of cases dealing with the problem.7
' Prettyman, J. (dissenting) : ". . . I wish the law were as the opinion of the
court in this case holds it to be, but I am convinced that it is not." 190 F. 2d 289.
1 10A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §60.02 (Rev. vol. 1948),
citing PoMERoY's EQuIrY JURISPRUDENCE §805 (4th ed. 1918) : "(1) There must
be conduct-acts, language or silence amounting to a representation or conceal-
ment of material facts. (2) These facts must be known to the party estopped
at the time of such conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowl-
edge of them is necessarily imputed to him. (3) The truth concerning these
facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel
at the time of such conduct, and at the time it was acted upon by him. (4) The
conduct must be accompanied by the intention, or at least the expectation, that
it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is
both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon. (5) The conduct must
be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon
it; and (6) he must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his posi-
tion for the worse; in other words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss if
he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by reason
of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights
inconsistent with it."
' Sterns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54 (1934) ; Robbins v. United States,
21 F. Supp. 403 (Ct. Cl. 1937); Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co. v. United States,
2 F. Supp. 126 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 749 (1933). See Atlas, The
Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax Cases, 3 TAX L. REv. 71 (1948).
In 10A MERTENS, LAW op FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §60.02 (Rev. vol. 1948),
it is stated that the application of "quasi estoppel" seems limited to suits for re-
fund, and that the "other doctrine" of estoppel has not been superseded. The latter
statement is undoubtedly true (see page 367, infra), but the accuracy of the first
statement is doubted. See Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 283 (D. C. Cir.
1951) ; Eichelberger & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. 2d 874 (5th Cir. 1937).
" The most surprising thing is the persistence of counsel in advancing the argu-
ment of estoppel when it has met with such singular lack of success in the past.
"Yet it is a blunt fact in these tax" litigations that, while the Commissioner has
again and again achieved estoppel of a taxpayer, the taxpayer's attempts to estop
the Commissioner have, practically without exception, failed utterly." Maguire
and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 HARV.
L. REv. 1281, 1299-1300 (1935) ; Note, Reliance on Advice of Government Officials,
33 CORNELL L. Q. 607, 609 (1948) (". . . the Government has been markedly
more successful in setting up estoppels against the taxpayer than has the taxpaiyer
in his battles against the Government.") ; Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax
Cases, 3 TAX L. REv. 71, 79 (1948); 10A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §60.13 (Rev. vol. 1948).
For a discussion of principles involved where the government seeks to -estop
the taxpayer, see Sterns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54 (1933); 10A MER-
TENs; op. cit., supi, §§60.04-60.12; Maguire and Zimet, op. cit., supra; Atlas, op.
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I. RELIANCE UPON COURT DECISIONS
Collateral Estoppel
Seemingly, the strongest case that could be presented for the exer-
cise of an estoppel against an asserted tax would be where the same
issue was litigated in a former tax year, and found in favor of the tax-
payer. Such a situation is governed by a doctrine classified as "collat-
eral estoppel."18  If the same parties are involved, 9 and the same
question of liability is in issue,10 with the only difference being the tax
year involved, the question is the extent to which the former adjudica-
tion controls the present suit. The Supreme Court, in Tait v. Western
Maryland Ry.," held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was appli-
cable to federal tax cases. The application of the doctrine is restricted
to those cases where all of the operative facts involved in a decision on
a particular point of law are precisely the same.' 2 An intervening
cit., supra. The author will not refer to such situations except as they directly
affect the topic under discussion.I "That aspect of the generic concept of res judicata which prevents reliti-
gation, in a second case, of issues of fact or law which were necessarily litigated
and decided in an earlier case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action." Note, Collateral Estoppel as to Questionis of Law in Federal
Tax Cases, 35 IOWA L. REv. 700 (1950). This doctrine is often erroneously
spoken of as res judicata, but the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable where
a different cause of action is involved. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTs §45, com-
ment c (1948). "It is uniformly held that each tax year gives rise to a different
cause of action." 10A MERTENS, LAW oF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION §60.23, p.
221 (Rev. vol. 1948) ; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1942). There seems to be no valid distinction between adjudications of fact
and adjudications of law, as far as the applicability of the doctrine of "collateral
estoppel" is concerned. Griswold, Res Judicata i; Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE
L. J. 1320 (1937).
Any prior adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction is sufficient to
support this doctrine, all other factors being present. Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U. S. 591, 597 (1947). An adjudication by the Tax Court (or Board of
Tax Appeals) is such an adjudication for purposes of the application of the doc-
trine. Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, 147 F. 2d 63, 66 (1st Cir. 1945). This is
true even if the "determination" was made under a rule 50 proceeding. Com-
missioner v. Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co., 176 F. 2d 523 (10th Cir. 1949).
'The taxpayer must be the same, or in privity with the taxpayer appearing
in the first suit. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 597 (1948); Capital
Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F. 2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948). The represent-
ative of the government is not required to be the same. This might occur where
the Commissioner was a party to the first suit and the second is against the United
States or the Collector (Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U. S. 620 (1933)) ;
where the United States is the party to the first action and the subsequent suit
is against the Collector (Second Nat. Bank v. Woodworth, 66 F. 2d 170 (6th
Cr. 1933)) or the Commissioner (Garcia v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1027) ;
and where the first suit is by the Collector and the subsequent suit is against the
United States or the Commissioner (INT. REv. CoDE §3772 (d)). For a history
of the development of the last stated rule, see Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal
Tax Cases, 46 YALE L. J. 1320, 1340 (1937) and 10A MEaTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL
INcoME TAXATION §6021 (Rev. vol. 1948).
" Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353 (1876) ; Pelham Hall Co. v.
Hassett, 147 F. 2d 63 (1945).
11289 U. S. 620 (1933).
"Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 600 (1948), 48 Co. L. REv. 963;
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change in the applicable statute or administrative regulation will pre-
vent its application.'3  Similarly, where an intervening decision of a
state court changes the applicable state law,14 or where a federal case
changes the relevant federal law,' 5 the doctrine is inapplicable. This
doctrine has been criticized as allowing one taxpayer to escape taxation
because of an erroneous court opinion, while others similarly situated
are not so affected.' In the light of the restrictive view the courts
have taken toward the application of collateral estoppel in tax cases,
24 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 239 (1949) ; Gillespie v. Commissioner, 151 F. 2d 903 (10th
Cir. 1946); Stoddard v. Commissioner, 141 F. 2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); Campana
Corp. v. Harrison, 135 F. 2d 334 (7th Cir. 1943). The facts must actually have
been passed upon, as the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to those
issues which might have been decided but were not. Wurtsbaugh v. Commissioner,
187 F. 2d 975 (5th Cir. 1951); Stanback v. Robertson, 183 F. 2d 889 (4th Cir.
1950); Trapp v. United States, 177 F. 2d 1 (10th Cir. 1948); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F. 2d 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 787 (1943).
Where a former decision approved of the reasonableness of compensation paid,
but not the method of arriving at that amount, the former action was held to
constitute no basis for the application of collateral estoppel as to the resonable-
ness of compensation paid in subsequent years. The court stated that a change
in "economic conditions" changed the concept of "reasonableness." Burford-
Toothaker Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 633 (5th Cir. 1951).
"'Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 601 (1948) ; Commissioner v.
Security-First Nat. Bank, 148 F. 2d 937 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Boeing v. United States,
98 F. Supp. 581 (Ct. Cl. 1951). But cf. Home Oil Mill v. Willinghami 86 F.
Supp. 568 (N. D. Ala. 1950) (while the decision was based upon the merits of
the case, the court did not permit an intervening General Counsel's Memorandum
to defeat collateral estoppel).
" Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937) ; Masterson v. Commissioner, 141
F. 2d 391 (5th Cir. 1944). This has been held to apply, even though the state
proceedings were "non adversary." Thomas Flexible Coupling Co., 14 T. C. 802
(1950). Cf. Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1948).
The Commissioner charged that the state proceedings were non adversary. The
court answered this by stating: "Whatever may have been the nature of the state-
court suit in its inception, the appeal made it adversary . . . especially as, on
appeal from the state-court judgment, one judge dissented. The fact that the
appeal was considered shows that the judgment was not by consent, for a consent-
judgment by its nature precludes an appeal."
"After some divergence by the courts of appeal, the Supreme Court, in Com-
missioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948), 48 COL. L. REv. 963; 24 N. Y. U.
L. Q. R-v. 239 (1949), settled this" question. Sellin, The Sunnen Case-A Logical
Terminus to the "Issue" of Res Judicata in Tax Cases, 4 TAX L. REv. 363
(1949) ; Note, Collateral Estoppel as to Questions of Law in Federal Tax Cases,
35 IowA L. Ray. 700 (1950).
The question of what constitutes a change in the federal law has given rise to
new problems. The Sunnen case indicated that a decision of the Supreme Court
was necessary (". . . a modification or growth in legal principles as enunciated
in intervening decisions of this Court may also effect a significant change in the
situation." 333 U. S. at 600 (emphasis added)). Cf. Bush v. Commissioner, 175
F. 2d 391 (2d Cir. 1949), 11 U. OF Pirr. L. REv. 68 (1950), where an inter-
vening decision of the same court, one judge different, was held sufficient to defeat
collateral estoppel.
1' Conversely, where the previous suit is unfavorable to the taxpayer, he bears
a burden not necessarily borne by others. See 61 A. B. A. REP. 821, 831 (1936);,
Sellin, The Sunnen Case-A Logical Terminus to the "Issue" of Res Judicata in
Tax Cases, 4 TAx L. Rxv. 363, 365 (1949); Bird, Res Judicata, 23 TAXES 684
(1945); Griswold, Res Judicata it Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L. J. 1320,
1357-58 (1937); Note, 33 COL L. REV. 1404 (1933); Note, Collateral Estoppel
as to Questions of Lao in Federal Tax Cases, 35 IowA L. Rzv. 700, 704-05 (1950).
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An entirely different situation is presented when the taxpayer was
not a party to the case upon which he relied to determine his tax liability.
This raises the question of whether or not reliance upon a court decision
is of any value if the decision is subsequently reversed or overruled. In
Helvering v. Griflths,'8 the Supreme Court stated, as one of the grounds
for refusing to overrule a former decision interpreting a revenue statute,
that the change would operate retroactively. This, reasoned the Court,
would cause transactions to be taxed which were not taxable under the
former interpretation. 19 It has been pointed out that this was the effect
of Helvering v. Gerhardt,20 under which decision 1,500 employees of
the Port of New York Authority unexpectedly found themselves liable
for back income taxes for at least eleven years.2 ' From the taxpayer's
point of view, the same result will obtain whether the change in the
statutory interpretation is made by the highest court overruling a former
decision22 or where a higher court renders a decision contrary to lower
court interpretations.2 3  There is undoubtedly some logic in allowing
a person to rely upon the judicial interpretation of a statute,24 but the
17 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948) ; notes 12-16, supra. But see
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 38 (1950).18 318 U. S. 371 (1943).
19 The disseting justices thought such effect "none of our business," 318 U. S.
at 408. The case under discussion was Eisener v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
20304 U. S. 405 (1938), 24 CORNELL L. Q. 611 (1939), 48 YALE L. J. 137
(1938). Similar cases in the estate tax field are Commissioner v. Church's Estate,
335 U. S. 632 (1949) and Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940). Justice Rob-
erts, dissenting in Hallock, pointed out that the rule overturned by the majority had
been uniformly followed in not less than fifty cases. He then stated: "If there
ever was an instance in which the doctrine of stare decisis should govern, this
is it. Aside from the obvious hardship involved in treating the taxpayers in the
present cases differently from many others whose cases have been decided or
closed in accordance with the settled rule, there are the weightier considerations
that the judgments now rendered disappoint the just expectations of those who
have acted in reliance upon the uniform construction of the statute by this and
all other federal tribunals. . . " 309 U. S. at 129. For the administrative and
Congressional reaction to this and similar decisions, see note 27 infra.
"See Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L.
REv. 121 (1940); Notes, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 611 (1939), 48 YALE L. J. (1938).
These employees and other state employees were never called upon to pay this
tax, as Congress intervened. See note 27 infra.
22 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
"2 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 (1940) ; United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S.
540 (1938). When relying upon a lower court opinion the taxpayer should be
aware that they are subject to "the fallibility which is inherent in all courts except
those of last resort." Broome v. Davis, 87 Ga. 584, 5861 13 S. E. 749 (1891).
" One of the underlying difficulties of this problem is the question of whether
a court decision is the law or merely evidence of the law. The author will rnot
attempt to discuss this question. See Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling De-
cision, 18 N. C. L. Rihv. 199 (1940) ; Freeman, Reli'oactive Operation of Decisions,
18 CoL. L. Ray. 230 (1918) ; Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common 4itdw, 17
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practical effect of binding the government to such interpretation even if
erroneous would be highly unfavorable upon the efficient collection of
revenue.2 5  While arguments have been advanced that court decisions
should only operate prospectively, 26 the fact remains that they operate
retrospectively; therefore no valid basis for the assertion of an estoppel
would seem to exist because of reliance upon court decisions.
2 7
COL. L. REv. 593 (1917); Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Re-
sort, 37 HARV. L. Rxv. 409 (1924); Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overrul-
ing' Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 121 (1941) ; Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 L. Q. REv.
180 (1934).
" The Supreme Court has stated that where a problem of statutory construction
is involved, the policy is to "observe the time honored admonition of restricting
the scope of our decisions to the circumstances before us." Helvering v. Stuart,
317 U. S. 154, 170 (1942). If such a doctrine be applied in connection with the"prospective operation" theory, certain practical difficulties arise. This can be
shown hypothetically: In the case of Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938),
the decision made 1,500 employees of the Port of New York Authority liable for
eleven years back income taxes. If the "prospective operation" theory were applied,
these persons would only be liable for future taxes, and there would be no liability
for past years. The litigating party could hardly receive this advantage, however,
for it is difficult to see how the court could render a decision that the taxpayer's
salary was taxable, and at the same time deny the collector the right to collect
the tax. Compare with this the situation of an employee of some other state
agency, not of the Port Authority type. If the decision be restricted to "the cir-
cumstances before the court," these latter employees would not seem to be affected
by the decision. Upon what basis would their salaries be handled? If the Com-
missioner sought to tax them under the Court decision, he could only look to
future salaries. If he attempted to tax them under the general authority of the
statute, one of their number could litigate the matter and, under the "prospective
operation" theory preclude the Commissioner from collecting for past years.
The absurd results reached clearly indicate that the operation of such a theory
is all but impossible in the field of taxation. As pointed out, the Court has recog-
nized that its decisions operate retroactively. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U. S.
371 (1943). Also, the Court has recognized that any other doctrine would not
be feasible. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1939): "We do not
mean to imply that the inevitably empiric process of construing tax legislation
should give rise to an estoppel against the responsible exercise of the judicial
process."
6 See authorities cited in note 24 supra.
"'See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1939). In Higgins v. Smith,
308 U. S. 473 (1940) the Court held that the taxpayer was not justified in relying
upon the decisions of four courts of appeal and consistent Board of Tax Appeals
cases, as the Commissioner had not acquiesced. If the taxpayer had relied upon
the Commissioner's interpretation, and the Supreme Court had subsequently held
the prior court opinions to be correct, no estoppel would lie. See page 366.
While some types of court decisions are made to operate only prospectively
(see Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. Rrv. 121
(1941)), the Gerhardt and similar cases seem to establish the fact that tax de-
cisions operate retrospectively. It has been suggested that Congress limit the
retrospective effect of court decisions which cause inequitable results. See Note,
48 YALE L. J. 137, 139 (1938). In several cases, Congress has done this. Fol-
lowing the Gerhardt case, the 1,500 employees of the Port of New York Authority,
and all other state employees affected by that decision, were relieved of liability
for the past year's taxes by the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 574
(1939). This Act included a provision for refund of all taxes paid on such sal-
aries. The Act did, of course, tax all such salaries earned after the date of its
passage. See INT. REv. CODE §22(a).
Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U. S. 623 (1949), which overruled May
v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930), was limited by the Technical Changes Act of
1949, 63 STAT. 891 (1949). See INT. REv. CODE §811(c)(2). For the reasons
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II. RELIANCE UPoN TREASURY REGULATIONS
The above situations. occur occasionally, but more frequently the
taxpayer acts in reliance upon a regulation or other ruling of the Bureau,,
or upon a representation made by the Commissioner or some lesser
government functionary. In this situation, the strongest case for the
raising of an estoppel would seem to be where reliance was placed upon
a formal regulation promulgated by the Treasury Department. If such
is the case, two factors must be considered: Was it a legislative or an
interpretative regulation; and, what cognizance has it received, if any,
from Congress or the courts?
Interpretative Regulations
Interpretative regulations are issued under the general authority of
section 3791 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that the
Commissioner "shall prescribe and publish all needful rules and regu-
lations for the enforcement of [the Code]." The courts have generally
held that regulations issued under the authority of this section are to
be regarded as merely stating the Treasury's construction of the stat-
ute.2 8 If a taxpayer acts in reliance on one of these interpretative
regulations, and the Commissioner later changes the regulation, or, in
case of litigation, presses a different construction of the statute upon
the court, no estoppel will operate to prevent such action.2 9 The courts
behind this Act, see SEN. RaP. No. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, reprinted in
1949-2 Cum. Bu. 289. Another limitation upon the retroactive effect of a judicial
decision was made by the Technical Changes Act of 1949. By amendment to sec-
tion 1000(g) of the INT. Ray. CODE, the Act relieved the retroactive effect of
Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), which held reciprocal
trusts taxable as part of the estate of the settlor-beneficiary. See SEN. REP. No.
831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
The Bureau may also limit the retroactive effect of court decisions. Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1939) was thus limited by T. D. 5512, U. S. TRES.
REG. 105 §81.17(3). See also, I. T. 3609, 1943 Cum. BuLL. 505, which limits
the retroactive applicability of Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
See Dwan, Administrative Review of Court Decisions, 46 Cor- L. REV. 581,
596 (1946) ; Pavenstedt, Congress Deactivates Another Bombshell: The Mitigation
of Churcl and Spiegel, 5 TAX L. REV. 309 (1950).
" Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. 2d 954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756
(1937) ; Walker v. United States, 83 F. 2d 103 (8th Cir. 1936) ; 10A MF.awRTs,
LAw oF FERAL INcOME TAXATION §60.14 (Rev. vol. 1948). The consideration
to be given a regulation where an estoppel is sought is not to be confused with
the weight given to such a regulation as an aid to statutory construction. Where
the courts are concerned with the regulations for this latter purpose, such regu-
lations are said to have weight varying all the way from "the force and effect
of law" (Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 342, 349 (1919)),
to "no higher dignity than an expression of opinion" (Douglas v. Edwards, 298
Fed. 229, 245 (2d Cir. 1924). For a general discussion of this problem see
Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COL. L. Rav. 252,
260 (1940); Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the
Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. Rax. 556, 557 (1940) ; Cole, From
Treasury Decision to Judicial Decision, 12 TAX MAG. 531, 532 (1934); Paul,
Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALE L. J. 660,
662 n. 13 (1940).
," Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F. 2d 36 (7th Cir. 1944); Blum-
(Vol. 30
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take the view that "the Commissioner can not make or change the law
by regulations and a regulation at variance with the import of the
statute is of no effect." 30  Thus, reliance upon the regulation would
seem to form no more basis for an estoppel than reliance upon the
advice of any competent person or upon the tax services or legal
periodicals.
3'
This situation can be complicated by the fact that under certain
circumstances, the regulation may be said to, have been adopted by
Congress. This result might occur when there is reenactment of a
statute following the issuance of interpretative regulations as to its con-
struction. Recent cases have left the problem in a rather indefinite
state,0 2 but some rules as to the application of "adoption by reenact-
ment" are well settled. If the court finds that Congress has adopted
the regulation, then the Commissioner, the taxpayer, and the court must
follow it.3 3 Thus, while the defense of estoppel would be of no avail,
the taxpayer might hold the Commissioner to his original ruling under
the legislative adoption theory.34 This doctrine is inapplicable where
the statute is clear, 35 where the regulation is contrary to the language
berg v. Smith, 138 F. 2d 956 (7th Cir. 1943); Tonningsen v. Commissioner, 61
F. 2d 199 (9th Cir. 1932) ; Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F. 2d 691 (W. D. Ky. 1925),
aff'd, 13 F. 2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S, 721 (1926); Ben
Stocker, 12 B. T. A. 1348 (1928). See Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax
Cases, 3 TAx L. REv. 71, 79 (1947). Cf. Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39,
49-54 (1939).
"T. T. Rudolph, 6 B. T. A. 265, 269 (1927). See M. E. Blatt Co. v. United
States, 305 U. S. 267, 279 (1938) ("Treasury regulations can add nothing to
income as defined by Congress."); Southern Maryland Agricultural Fair Ass'n,
40 B. T. A. 549, 552 (1939) ("The Commissioner by his regulations cannot
change the law.").
"See Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the In-
come, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. Rav. 556, 558 (1940).
" Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940) ; Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co.,
308 U. S. 90 (1939); Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110
(1939).
" Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939) ; Helvering
v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938); Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264 (1938);
Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 289 (1934); Squibb
& Sons v. Helvering, 98 F. 2d 69 (2d Cir. 1938); Mayes v. Paul Jones & Co.,
270 Fed. 121 (6th Cir. 1921) ; Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil
Case, 40 CoL L. REv. 252, 265 (1940); Brown, Regulations, Re-enactment, and
the Revenue Acts, 54 HARV. L. REv. 377, 382 (1941).
" Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939) ; Commis-
sioner v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 114 F. 2d 314, 323 (1st Cir. 1940) ("The Com-
missioner should not fiow be permitted to apply retroactively . . . any new regu-
lations made after the tax years in question, particularly after Congressional
re-enactment under the previous regulations."). Since the enactment of the Code,
the "adoption by re-enactment" rule has become of much less importance. The
entire revenue act is no longer re-enacted each year, but amendments are now
made to the Code.
" Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 573, 582 (1938) ; Koshland v. Helvering,
298 U. S. 441 (1936); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. United States, 282 U. S.
740 (1931); Slough v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 836 (6th Cir. 1945); Paul, Use
and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALu L. J. 660
(1940).
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of the' statute,3 6 or where the regulation is ambiguous.8 7  It has been
suggested that the mere 'reenactment of a statute has no weight what-
soever'; that it must at least be shown that Congress was cognizant of
the regulation.38 Further, if the regulation was issued contempo-
rane6usly with the passage of the act,8 9 and if it has been long recog-
nized,40 there is more likelihood that the adoption rule will be applied.
If the taxpayer relie§ upon a regulation which has not been adopted
under the reenactment rule, is it of any assistance to him that a court
adopted the interpretation of the regulation? The answer seems to be
that it is not.
4 1
Legislative Regulations
As pointed out, certain regulations might properly be classified as
legislative, as distinguished from interpretative.4 Such regulations are
The statutory language must be ambiguous (Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327
(1930)); general (Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110
(1939)); silent (United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 (1933)) ;
doubtful (McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (1931)); or
susceptible of two constructions (R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Commissioner,
97 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1938)) before the regulation will be considered as repre-
senting the correct interpretation of the statute. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of
Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L.
REv. 556, 559-60 (1940).
" See note 30, supra. Clifford, Jr. v. United States, 105 F. 2d 586 (8th
Cir. 1939) ; Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F. 2d 790 (7th Cir. 1938) ; F. W. Wool-
worth v. United States, 91 F. 2d 973 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 768
(1938); Boca Ratone Co. v. Commissioner, 86 F. 2d 9 (3rd Cir. 1936); Lang-
staff v. Lucas, 9 F. 2d 691 (W. D. Ky. 1925), aff'd, 13 F. 2d 1022 (6th Cir.
1926) ; Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49
YALE L. J. 660, 668-69 (1940).
"Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939) ; Burnet v. Chicago
Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1 (1932) ; Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245 (1926).
• .. the mere re-enactment of a statute following administrative construction
should be given no weight whatsoever in determining the proper construction of
the statute." Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REV.
398, 400 (1941). Cf. Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L.
Rzv. 1311 (1941), followed by Griswold, Postscriptumn, 54 HARv. L. Rzv. 1323
(1941).
" Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315
(1933) ; "The practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its
machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while
they are yet untried and new." See Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations
Problem, 54 HAv. L. REV. 398, 405 (1941); Note, 52 HARy. L. Ray. 1163, 1164
(1939). Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
"0 McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F. 2d 585 (D. C. Cir. 1942) ; Evansville
Courier v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d 232 (7th Cir. 1933).
" Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938). But the court might consider
this factor when passing on the validity of the regulation. See Commissioner v.
H. W. Porter & Co., 187 F. 2d 939 (3rd Cir. 1951); O'Malley v. Yost, 186 F.
2d 603 (8th Cir. 1951).
If recognition and approval of a regulation by a court would make the regu-
lation "more authoritative," a regulation made pursuant to a court opinion would
seem to have at least the same "authoritative" weight. Courts have not given
thes'e latter regulations such effect. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
Cf. -Averill v. Commissioner, 101 F. 2d 644 (1st Cir. 1938).
42 Unfortunately, the courts do not always differentiate between interpretative
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not issued under a general grant of authority as are the interpretative
regulations, but rather, are issued under specific authority contained in
particular sections of the Code.4 If the Code section granting authority
for the regulations sets out sufficiently definite standards for the guid-
ance of the Commissioner, and the regulations issued under this author-
ity are within the standards set, they are said to have the force and
effect of law.4 4  Until amended, these regulations must be followed.4
An amendment, to have retroactive effect, probably needs specific statu-
tory authority,46 and any retroactive amendment is subject to the same
limitation as a retroactive law.47 Thus, the taxpayer may feel relatively
and legislative regulations. In Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90
(1939) the Court allowed the Commissioner to amend a regulation, even though
the basic statute had been re-enacted several times by Congress. The regulation
was legislative, but the Court failed to make any distinction. Thus, while the
case was correctly decided, as pertains to a legislative regulation, there is doubt
as to its application to an interpretive regulation. Also, the Commissioner did not
seek to give the amendment retroactive effect, although it was applied to a trans-
action which was handled by the taxpayer under a binding election made under
the original regulation. The Supreme Court has not wholly disregarded the dis-
tinction, but it has been given little effect. See Burnet v. S. & L. Building Corp.,
288 U. S. 406, 415 (1933) ; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 378
(1931) ; Brown, Regulations, Re-enactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HAgv. L.
REv. 377, 385 (1941). But cf. Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F. 2d 317 (D. C. Cir.),
aff'd, 299 U. S. 171 (1936).
"'E.g., INT. REV. CODE §§22(c), 112(2), 118(b), 170, 189. These sections do
not always contain uniform language. For a discussion of the effect of the dif-
ferent wording in the Code sections, see Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treas-
ury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REv.
556, 577-78 (1940)."' Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127 (1924) ; Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F.
2d 317, aff'd, 299 U. S. 171 (1936); Titsworth v. Commissioner, 73 F. 2d 385
(3rd Cir. 1934).
"'Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90 (1939), discussed in note 42
supra. The courts have indicated that these regulations will not be interfered
with unless in excess of the Commissioner's authority (Commissioner v. General
Machinery Corp., 95 F. 2d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 1938)), violative of provisions of
the statute (Corner Broadway-Maiden Lane, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 759,
761 (6th Cir. 1938)), or arbitrary and unreasonable in their application (Finance
& Guaranty Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F. 2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1931)). See HNDER-
SON, INmoDucrio To INCOME TAXATION 78 (2nd ed. 1949); Note, 52 HARv. L.
REv. 1163, 1165 (1939).
"8 See Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COL. L.
REv. 252, 264 (1940). But cf. INT. REv. CODE §3791(b) : "The Secretary or the
Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if
any, to which any ruling, regulations, or Treasury Decision, relating to the in-
ternal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect." The necessary
implication is that unless so prescribed, these regulations, etc., may have retroactive
effect. While the subsection refers to "any ruling, regulations, or Treasury De-
cision," the Congressional intent seems to be to limit its application to the inter-
pretative regulations, the authority for which appears in subsection (a) of the
same section.
"¢ The courts will not construe a revenue provision retroactively unless its
language dearly so requires. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323
U. S. 141, 164 (1944); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U. S.
422, 424 (1944). Cf. Commissioner v. Commodore, Inc., 135 F. 2d 89 (6th Cir.
1943) (court refused to permit retroactive application of statute by way of Treas-
ury Regulation, where statutory language did not require such application). If,
however, the statute is so worded as to require retroactive operation, that fact
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safe in relying upon this type of regulation if it appears to meet the
requirements for valid legislative regulations.
48
In addition to the formal regulations, the Commissioner issues vari-
ous informal bulletins, memoranda, and rulings upon tax matters.49
Where such an informal ruling is made, and a taxpayer other than the
one to whom the ruling was made relies upon it, no estoppel can be
raised by such reliance. 0 Also, such rulings are not subject to the
reenactment rule,51 nor can they be classified as legislative regulations.5 2
alone will not render it invalid. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15 (1931).
However, a statute may be so "arbitrary and capricious" as to offend the Fifth
Amendment. On this ground retroactive application has been denied in a num-
ber of cases. E.g., Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927) (Revenue Act of
1918 §402(c), Comp. STAT. §6336 Yc, taxed transfers of property intended to take
effect in possession and enjoyment at or after decedent-donor's death, held un-
constitutional as applied to good faith transfers before its passage, which were
not, in fact, in contemplation of death); Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93
(1935) (same type of statute; Court followed Nichols v. Coolidge). An excel-
lent discussion of the problem by Judge Learned Hand appears in Cohan v. Com-
missioner, 39 F. 2d 540, 545 (1930) (". . . in extreme cases transactions, untaxed
when they took place, cannot be reached by a later statute, certainly when not in
contemplation at the time."). See generally, Ballard, Retroactive Federal Tax-
ation, 48 HAxv. L. Rv. 592 (1935); Smith, Retroactive Income Taxation, 33
YALE L. J. 35 (1923).
In Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129 (1936)
the Commissioner issued a legislative regulation upon which the taxpayer relied.
Later, the regulation was amended in such a manner as to make the taxpayer
liable for a greater tax if the regulation were retroactively applied. The Court
held that the former regulation was invalid, as being out of harmony with the
statute and as being unreasonable, and then stated: "The contention that the
new regulation is retroactive is without merit. Since the original regulation could
not be applied, the amended regulation in effect became the primary and con-
trolling rule in respect of the situation presented. It pointed the way, for the
first time, for correctly applying the antecedent statute to a situation which arose
under the statute." 207 U. S. at 135. This decision brings to mind the famous
quotation: "That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet."
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet. Act II, Sc. 2, Line 33.
48 See note 44 supra.
48 Commissioner's rulings, General Counsel's memoranda, Treasury Decisions
(which do not become regulations until approved by the Secretary, Wood v. Com-
missioner, 75 F. 2d 364 (1st Cir. 1935)), and others.
" Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 (1934) ; Aluminum Co.
of America v. United States, 123 F. 2d 615 (3rd Cir. 1941); Janney v. Com-
missioner, 108 F. 2d 564 (3rd Cir.), aff'd, 311 U. S. 189 (1940); Santa Monica
Mountain Park Co. v. United States, 99 F. 2d 450 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Baltimore &
0. Ry. v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 83 (D. Md. 1941) ; Bedford Mills v. United
States, 2 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1933). The Bureau emphasizes this by printing
across the cover page of every issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin that "spe-
cial attention is directed to the cautionary notice on page II that published rulings
of the Bureau do not have the force and effect of Treasury Decisions and that
they are applicable only to the facts presented in the published case." See Guy
T. Gibson, Inc., 46 B. T. A. 1015 (1942); Oberwinder v. Commissioner, 147 F.
2d 255 (8th Cir. 1945); HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL TAXATION §28
(2nd ed. 1949).
Also, other administrative agencies may not estop the collection of taxes. See
United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60 (1940) where the Court held that the Farm
Loan Board was without authority to make representations that certain trans-
actions would be tax exempt. Accord, Hazel W. Carmichael, P-H 1948 TC
Mem. Dec. 48,080." Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 573, 582 (1938); Aluminum Co. of
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III. RELIANCE UPON TAXPAYER'S RULINGS AND SIMILAR
DEPARTMENTAL DECISIONS
In each of the above situations, it is to be noted that there were no
representations, as such, made to the taxpayer whose tax is now in con-
troversy. In each situation discussed, the particular interpretation of
the statute was what might be classed as impersonal, so far as the tax-
payer was concerned. But, as pointed out, these situations would seem
to form the strongest foundation for reliance by a taxpayer as they are
all relatively authoritative pronouncements of the law. However, the
doctrine of estoppel in pais is not applicable for several reasons,53 and
the doctrine of "equitable" or "quasi estoppel" has not been applied to
any of these situations. 5 4 The question then arises as to whether some
other and possibly less reliable interpretation of the statute can form
a stronger basis for an estoppel.
In many cases, informal rulings are made or other action is taken
in a particular taxpayer's case. The Commissioner or some lesser agent
may make a ruling, offer advice, or in some other way directly influence
the action of a particular taxpayer. It is here that the doctrine of
"equitable" or "quasi estoppel" is most frequently mentioned.55  This
doctrine, first voiced in cases involving estoppel against a taxpayer, was
thus stated by Justice Cardozo:
". Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized
as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. The label counts for little.
Enough for present purposes that the disability has its roots in a
principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon
his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. ... A
suit may not be built on an omission induced by him who sues."5 6
In many of the cases involving dealings between an individual tax-
payer and a government agent, the courts refuse to recognize any such
"equitable" or "quasi estoppel" and fall back to the requirements of-
estoppel in pais. Thus, application of the doctrine of estoppel has been
denied on the ground that the government agents had made mere state-
America v. United States, 123 F. 2d 615, 621 (3rd Cir. 1941) ; Brown, Regida-
tions, Re-enactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARv. L. Rnv. 377, 390 (1941)." Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 573, 582 (1938); Lynch v. Tilden Pro-
duce Co., 265 U. S. 315, 321 (1924).
" See note 5 supra. In the great majority of cases, the only elements of
estoppel in pais present are (5) and (6).
"' Even the doctrine of "quasi estoppel" requires the party against whom the
estoppel is asserted to have caused the other to act or refrain from acting. See
note 63 infra. Cf. Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
" See note 97 infra. Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d, 283 (D. C. Cir.
1951).
"' Sterns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54, 62 (1938).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ments of opinion57 or statements of law,58 rather than the required
misrepresentation of fact,59 The question of what can be said to be
opinion, fact, or law is often a difficult one, and this point is avoided
by most courts.60 Other courts, seeking to avoid passing on the ques-
tion of the applicability of the doctrine, find that the person making the
representation had no authority to do so," or that the reliance upon the
statement was unreasonable. 2  ("Equitable" or "quasi estoppel" makes
no such technical distinctions, but rather, is applied in a very non-
technical manner. 63 ) Some of the cases refuse to apply an estoppel
because of the statutory provision for binding closing agreements and
compromises, reasoning that the statutory method is exclusive.
6 4
Prospective Rulings and the Couzens Case
One of the most appealing cases for the application of the "equitable"
or "quasi estoppel" doctrine is where there has been a ruling made upon
a proposed transaction, reliance by the taxpayer upon this ruling, and
subsequent repudiation by the government. Such a situation resulted
from the sale of the minority interest in the Ford Motor Company by
Senator James Couzens.6 5 The sale was contingent upon the taxable
gain that would result and this, in turn, was contingent upon the fair
market value of the stock on March 1, 1913. The Commissioner, in
response to a request, made an elaborate investigation and placed a
value on the stock. In reliance upon this valuation, the stock was
1 Commissioner v. Duckwitz, 68 F. 2d 629 (7th Cir. 1934), affirming, 22
B. T. A. 358 (1931).
rl United States Trust Co. of New York, 13 B. T. A. 1074 (1928), cited and
followed in Elizabeth W. Boykin, 16 B. T. A. 477, 478 (1929). Cf. Sugar Creek
Coal & Mining Co., 31 B. T. A. 344, 348 (1934) "A mutual mistake of law is no
foundation for estoppel .... If it were there would be just as much ground for
the taxpayer to claim that the Government is estopped to change its position."
r See note 5 supra, element (1).
t'And legal writers. The author joins in the statement of Maguire and
Zimet, "We humbly decline the task of saying what is fact and what is law."
Hobsoi's Choice and Similar Pracrices it Federal Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REV.
1281, 1329, n. 176 (1935).
11 Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 445 (1933) ; Knapp-Monarch
Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 863 (8th Cir. 1944); Barnett Investment Co. v.
Nee, 72 F. Supp. 81 (W. D. Mo. 1947); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson,
257 Fed. 576 (S. D. N. Y. 1919), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 696 (1921); Searles
Real Estate Trust, 25 B. T. A. 1115 (1932) ; James Couzens, 11 B. T. A. 1040,
1149, 1174 (1928).
"Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 863 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Lang-
staff v. Lucas, 9 F. 2d 691 (W. D. Ky.), affd, 13 F. 2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1926).
" "Quasi estoppel" is applied "to prevent a wrong being done wherever, in good
conscience and honesty a party ought not to be permitted to repudiate his previous
statements and declarations." Mahoning Investment Co. v. United States, 3 F.
Supp. 622 (Ct. Cl. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 675 (1934). Stockstrom v. Com-
missioner, 190 F. 2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
11 INT. REV. CoDE §§3760 (closing agreements), 3761 (compromises). See
Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U. S. 282 (1929) ; Knapp-Monarch
Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 863 (8th Cir. 1944)."5James Couzens, 11 B. T. A. 1040 (1928).
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sold. Some years later, the Acting Commissioner assessed a large de-
ficiency, claiming an overvaluation by the former Commissioner. In
answer to an asserted estoppel by the taxpayer, the Board of Tax
Appeals stated:
"Such an argument must be treated with the utmost caution,
since its sanction in any case would result in having an individual
tax liability depend, not upon the factors and measures prescribed
by Congress as applicable to all, but upon the statements and
conduct of a particular government officer in respect of each
individual.
"... however it may be in cases involving contract or other
situations where the government deals on an equality with its
citizens, there is a necessity inherent in its sovereign power of
taxation which the doctrine of estoppel can resist in only the most
extraordinary case. Whether there may be such a case is not now
within our power to know."663
This quotation sums up two important considerations in cases involv-
ing estoppel against the government. The latter, dealing with the
capacity in which the government acts in the transaction, involves the
determination of whether the capacity is governmental or proprietary. 67
Such a distinction is sometimes made in cases where an estoppel is
asserted against the government; s8 but as the collection of revenue is
so obviously a governmental function the point is of little importance
in taxation cases. However, the concluding thought in the statement
is important to the law of taxation because of its recognition of the
fact that in an "extraordinary" case the doctrine of estoppel night be
successfully asserted.
The other point brought out in the quoted portion of the opinion,
that of having individual tax liability depend upon the statements and
conduct of a particular government agent, raises a more serious prob-
lem. In the first place, there can be no question but that this very
situation results every time the Commissioner decides not to upset an
erroneous ruling of a revenue agent.69 It is true that this decision is
"Id. at 1148, 1151. The Board then allowed the valuation to be reopened.
This revaluation resulted in an ultimate victory for the taxpayer, however, as the
redetermined March 1, 1913, value was higher than the original value assigned
by the Commissioner. From this revaluation, Senator Couzens realized less tax-
able gain than originally assessed.
"Still a government may suffer loss through the negligence of its officers.
If it comes down from its position of sovereignty and enters the domain of com-
merce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there." Cooke
v. United States, 91 U. S. 389, 398 (1875) ; Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. United
States, 98 F. Supp. 757 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Stein-Block Co., 23 B. T. A. 1162, 1167
(1931). See 19 Am. J R., Estoppel §169 (1939).
CS See note 67 supra.
Concerning the quoted portion of the text, it has been said that "If the first
part of this quotation should be read as a declaration of simple faith that when-
ever an executive department acts in normal routine the human factor vanishes and
perfectly precise results are mechanically achieved, it would be fit only for con-
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technically not binding upon the Commissioner but from a practical
standpoint, when the "file is closed" that brings the matter to an end.
Also, this decision is binding upon the government if it is coupled with
the running of the statute of limitations. Another practical point to
be considered is that, according to a former Chief Counsel of the Bureau,
the vast majority of the Bureau's rulings are honored by the Bureau,
even though they may be erroneous.7 ° In addition, the higher Treasury
officials have been given statutory authority to bind the government by
making closing agreements and compromises with taxpayers, even if
such agreement or compromise is based upon an erroneous interpre-
tation of the statute.71 So, if the possibility of an individual binding
the government be adopted as the objection to the application of estoppel
against the government, the aforementioned practices weaken the valid-
ity of such objection. However, when this objection is viewed in an-
other light, a practical reason appears for its support. As one author
has stated:
"The picture suggested is in part that of a revenue official not
entirely free from political insecurity, not very high up the de-
partmental ladder, not very well paid, not too sure he wishes to
stay permanently in government service. Persuasively opposed
to the official is a lawyer or accountant-sometimes a group of
such men, visible or invisible-highly trained, acutely interested
in the particular case, keen from knowledge that fees depend upon
success. Entirely without any suggestion of impropriety or
crookedness, the observer will suspect that private interest is
likely to be better served than public interest."
7 2
Where the picture is as suggested, there is some reason for the Com-
missioner to have the right to review any representations that might be
made in such a case. The Commissioner has for several years refused
to make such prospective rulings except under very strictly defined
conditions.73 Therefore, the occasions on which a taxpayer may attempt
to rely upon a prospective ruling will be much less numerous.
temptuous dismissal." Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices
vs Federal Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1301 (1935). In many instances, the
Commissioner is given the duty of making certain findings, thus by legislative man-
date doing that which the court refuses to allow. However, these findings do not
appear to be binding upon the government, when made. See Magill, Finality of
Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 28 COL. L. REv. 563, 565
(1928).
Wenchel, Taxpayer's Rulings, 5 TAX L. REV. 105, 113-14 (1950).
71 INT. REv. CODE §3760. See Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax Cases,
3 TAx L. Rxv. 71, 81 (1947). This authority has been delegated, in part, to the
Commissioner. See note 118 infra.
72 Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Tax-
ation, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1301 (1935). Cf. ". . . corruption might be en-
couraged if a taxpayer could obtain a ruling from a collector or Commissioner,
which would not be vulnerable to attack or reconsideration." Note, Reliance on
Advice of Government Officials, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 607, 613 (1948).
S3Memo. 4963, 1939 2 CuM. BuLL. 459:
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Commissioner's Power to Reopen Prior Administrative
Determinations
The Commissioner must necessarily make rulings on past trans-
actions, and as stated, he will make rulings on some prospective trans-
actions, leaving open this field for the possible application of the doctrine
of estoppel. For instance, where the Commissioner makes a finding of
fact, or a ruling, in a particular case involving past or future trans-
actions, and the taxpayer accepts this finding or ruling and pays his
tax thereon, the Commissioner or his successor may seek to reopen and,
reassess the taxpayer upon a finding or ruling different from that orig-
inally made. This is what occurred in the Couzens case as to a future
transaction and the Board of Tax Appeals allowed the Commissioner
so to act. This right is not always granted, however. Several early
cases refused, and at the present time the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit refuses, the Commissioner the right to upset the finding of his
predecessor.7 4 These cases rely upon the theory that an administrative
determination, once made within the authority of the particular agency,
cannot be upset except upon a showing of fraud or misrepresentation.5
"(2) Rulings will be made on prospective transactions only where the law or
regulations provide for a determination by the Commissioner of the effect of a
proposed transaction for tax purposes ....
See Wenchel, Taxpayer's Rulings, 5 TAx L. REv. 105, 108 (1950).
Closing agreements may be entered into in situations such as presented in the
Couzens case. See T. D. 4855, 1938-2 Cum. BULL. 252. See notes 116-118 infra.
Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F. 2d 178 (6th Cir. 1928); United States v. Detroit
Steel Products Co., 20 F. 2d 675 (E. D. Mich. 1927) ; Penrose v. Skinner, 278
Fed. 284, 286 (D. Colo. 1921), aff'd on rehearing, 298 Fed. 335 (D. Colo. 1932).
Cf. H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F. 2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951). These cases are
discussed in note 75 infra.
1 The case of Penrose v. Skinner, 278 Fed. 284, 286 (D. Colo. 1921), aff'd on
rehearing, 298 Fed. 335 (D. Colo. 1923) seems to be the first decision to have
dearly spelled out such a theory; this was, however, a dictum. The court cited
several Supreme Court and lower court cases in support, and while a few of the
lower court cases appear to support the theory, none of the Supreme Court cases
seem to do so. The next case promulgating the theory was United States v.
Detroit Steel Products Co., 20 F. 2d 675 (E. D. Mich. 1927), 37 YALE L. J. 255,
which followed Penrose v. Skinner. At approximately the same period, and on
the same set of facts, several other cases reached a contrary result. United States
v. Standard Spring Mfg. Co., 23 F. 2d 495 (D. Minn. 1927) ; followed in Champ
Spring Co. v. United States, 47 F. 2d 1 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 283 U. S.
852 (1931) ; United States v. Tuthill Spring Co., 55 F. 2d 415 (N. D. Ill. 1931) ;
United States v. Bartron, 35 F. 2d 765 (D. S. D. 1929). It is worthy of note
that the Detroit Steel Products case seems to have been cited in only two federal
cases. It was distinguished in United States v. Heilbroner, 22 F. Supp. 368, 370
(S. D. N. Y. 1938), aff'd, 100 F. 2d 379 (2d Cir. 1938), and approved in In re
Bowen, 48 F. Supp. 67 (E. D. Pa. 1942), revd, 138 F. 2d 22 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1944).
The next case advancing such a theory was the controversial decision of Wood-
worth v. Kales, 26 F. 2d 178 (6th Cir. 1928), noted with approval in 27 MicH.
L. REv. 677 (1929). The facts of the case were almost identical with those of
the Couzens case (see page 368), but the court refused to allow the Commissioner
to reopen the question of the March 1, 1913 value of the Ford stock. The court
stated that ". . . where the ascertaining of an essential fact is left to their
[officers of the government] discretionary judgment, where they exercise that dis-
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The Supreme Court has not passed on this question, but the other courts
of appeal which have passed on the question allow the Commissioner
the right to reopen his predecessor's findings.70 The Supreme Court
has passed upon the question of a Commissioner's right to reopen and
reassess upon his own findings, and has expressly held that he could
cretion in good faith and where thereupon the tax is computed and paid, it seem-
ingly must be the theory of normal operation that the matter is closed. . .. 'No
one will contend that a succeeding Commissioner could overrule or ignore the
decisions of his predecessor, unless such decisions were in law erroneous or tainted
with fraud [or mistake]." The court was quoting from Penrose v. Skinner. If
taken at its face value, this decision would be of little aid to a taxpayer, for, if
the previous findings were not erroneous, there is little likelihood that the Com-
missioner would seek to change it. However, this case has been relied upon by
taxpayers seeking to estop the Commissioner from reopening any previous de-
termination, made by himself or his predecessor. It has been distinguished in
several cases on the ground that it concerned an attempted reopening of a ruling
by a former Commissioner, while those cases concerned reopening by the same
Commissioner. These cases did deny the validity of the Kales case, however. Page
v. Lafayette Worsted Co., 66 F. 2d 339, 343 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S.
692 (1933) ; Holmquist v. Blair, 35 F. 2d 10, 13 (8th Cir. 1929) ; L. Loewy &
Son v. Commissioner, 31 F. 2d 652 (2d Cir. 1929); Francis P. Mcllhenny, 13
B. T. A. 290 (1928), aff'd, 39 F. 2d 356 (3rd Cir. 1930); J. I. R. Henry, 13
B. T. A. 295 (1928). Even the Sixth Circuit subsequently limited its effect, but
did not deny its validity. Austin Co. v. Commissioner, 35 F. 2d 910, 911 (6th
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 735 (1930). On substantially the same facts,
other courts have expressly reached a contrary view. Berry v. Westover, 70 F.
Supp. 537, 544 (S. D. Calif. 1947) ; Kelly v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 570, 581
(D. Mass. 1939) ; Stein-Block Co., 23 B. T. A. 1165 (1931) ("On practically the
same set of facts we, in James Cowmens . . .reached a different conclusion from
that reached in the Kales case, and such has been our consistent holding since
the former decision."). See also, cases cited in note 76 infra. The Supreme
Court has indicated a view contrary to the Kales case. See note 77 infra.
However, the Sixth Circuit has never repudiated the Kales case, and it has
been followed in that circuit. Routzan v. Brown, 95 F. 2d 766 (6th Cir. 1938) ;
Boyne City Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 47 F. 2d 772 (W. D. Mich. 1930); and see
Page v. Lafayette Worsted Co., supra, at 343 (dissenting opinion) ; Austin v.
Commissioner, vipra, at 914 (dissenting opinion). Several writers have seemingly
approved the Kales case. See Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar
Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. Rxv. 1281, 1292, n. 40 (1935) ("Wood-
worth v. Kales . . . , perhaps the best-known case, is somewhat favorable to the
taxpayer. But it must be handled cautiously.") ; Note, Res Judicata in Admin-
istrative Law, 49 YALE L. J. 1250, 1264-65 (1940); Note, 27 MicH. L. Ra,. 677
(1929).
In 1951, the Sixth Circuit was again presented with the question of the Com-
missioner's right to reopen a finding made by a predecessor. In H. S. D. Co. v.
Kavanagh, 191 F. 2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951) the court denied the right of the Com-
missioner to reopen such a finding, and cited in support, the Kales case. Thus,
after a lapse of thirteen years, this doctrine gets a "new lease on life." The
effect of this decision, as supporting such a theory, is weakened somewhat by the
reference of the court to the "unusual powers" given the Commissioner to approve
employee pension plans and trusts, which were in issue in that case. Also, the
court cited Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 132 (D. C. Cir. 1945) in support
of its refusal to allow a redetermination of the former finding. That case involved
a "duty of consistency" (see page 378, infra) rather than a question of the finality
of an administrative determination.
Cf. INT Rxv. CODE §3790, "In the absence of fraud or mistake or mathematical
calculations, the findings of fact in and the decisions of the Commissioner upon
... the merits of any claim . . . under . . . the internal revenue laws shall not...
[except by the Tax Court], be subject to review by any other administrative or
accounting officer, employee, or agent of the United States. . . ." [Italics added.]
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do so. 7 It is difficult to see why the Court of Appeals of the Sixth
Circuit does not feel bound by this rule in cases where the redetermina-
tion is made by a Commissioner other than the one making the original
determination s
Some of the courts which give the Commissioner the right to reopen
his own, or his predecessor's, findings and rulings give as one reason
for so doing that the taxpayer is not bound by such a ruling or de-
termination, and therefore the government should not be bound.7 9 How-
ever, in view of the many situations in which the Commissioner may
estop the taxpayer, with no corresponding right in the taxpayer against
the government, such reasoning seems questionable.80 As to past trans-
actions, a better reason seems to be that it would be difficult for the
taxpayer to show any damage from his reliance upon the finding, for
in any event, his liability will be no greater than it would have been
had the agent ruled correctly in the first instance."- Even the very
liberal doctrine of "quasi estoppel" requires that some damage result
to the person asserting the estoppel s.8 2  The cases allowing the Com-
missioner to reopen rulings made on future transactions 'do not have
"1 Keystone Auto Club v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1950); John
M. Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 49 F. 2d 254 (5th Cir. 1931); Sweets Co. of
America v. Commissioner, 40 F. 2d 436 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Overby v. United States,
44 F. 2d 268 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Oak Worsted Mills v. United States, 36 F. 2d 529
(Ct. Cl. 1929), new trial denied, 38 F. 2d 699 (Ct. Cl. 1930), aff'd on other
grounds, 282 U. S. 409 (1931) ; Handy & Hartman, 17 B. T. A. 980 (1929), aff'd,
284 U. S. 136 (1931) ; 10A MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN §60.15
(Rev. vol. 1948); Magill, Finality of Determinations of the Comnissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 28 COL. L. REV. 563, 566 (1928).
'7 Burnet v. Porter, 283 U. S. 230 (1931), approving Mcllhenny v. Commis-
sioner, 39 F. 2d 356 (3rd Cir. 1930). Accord, Blackhawk-Perry Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 182 F. 2d 319 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Okonite Co. v. Commissioner, 155 F.
2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1946); Chiquita Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 306
(9th Cir. 1945) ; Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 863 (8th Cir.
1944); New Jersey Woolen Mills v. Gnichel, 116 F. 2d 338 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 312 U. S. 709 (1940) ; Tonningsen v. Commissioner, 61 F. 2d 199 (9th
Cir. 1932) ; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F. 2d 281 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U. S. 690 (1932); Bumgartner v. Commissioner, 51 F. 2d 472 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 674 (1931); Levy v. Commissioner, 48 F. 2d 725
(9th Cir. 1931); Harriton v. Lucas, 41 F. 2d 429 (D. C. Cir. 1930); Taft Woolen
Mill v. United States, 38 F. 2d 704 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied on this point, 281 U. S.
717, aff'd on other grounds, 282 U. S. 409 (1930); cf. Stowe v. Commissioner,
190 F. 2d 723 (2d Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Neal, 65 F. 2d 761 (8th Cir.
1933).
18 Other courts of appeal seem to regard the two situations as being the same,
and cite cases involving either of the two situations as authority for allowing the
Commissioner to reopen his own or his predecessor's findings. See, e.g., McIl-
henny v. Commissioner, 39 F. 2d 356 (3rd Cir. 1930).
"1 Magill, Finality of Determinations by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
28 CoL. L. REV. 563, 569 (1928).
" See generally, Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices
in Federal Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1935); Atlas, The Doctrine of
Estoppel in Tax Cases, 3 TAx L. REv. 71 (1948).
" Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 863 (8th Cir. 1944). The
payment of interest, and possibility of a penalty, might constitute sufficient "dam-
age" to the taxpayer. This point does not appear to have been raised in any case.
8. The doctrine has been defined as being applicable "to prevent a wrong being
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this point to rely upon, and they either use the reasons stated in the
Couzens case, or rely upon the strict requirements of estoppel in pais. 8
Commissioner's Power to Change Existing Administrative
Rulings and Practices
In the cases just discussed, it is to be noted that the Commissioner,
or his predecessor, who made a ruling on a particular transaction, did
so to determine the tax liability for that year. If the ruling is changed,
it will have the effect of changing the tax liability for the year it which
the ruling was made. Suppose, however, that the transaction on which
the original ruling was made is of a recurring nature. If there has been
no subsequent change in the situation of the taxpayer, nor any change
in the applicable statute or regulation, can the Commissioner, after sev-
eral years, now assert a different rule for the current year? Here, the
asserted change is not intended to affect prior years, but only the cur-
rent and future years. This involves the question of the applicability
of the doctrine of "collateral estoppel" to Commissioner's rulings.
In Schafer v. Helvering,8 4 the taxpayer had filed his returns as a
dealer in securities. With full knowledge of the facts, the Commissioner
had approved of the taxpayer's action which was in accord with the
required practice of the Bureau. After allowing this for four years, the
Commissioner refused to allow the taxpayer to file as a dealer for the
year 1929. The taxpayer charged that the change in position was taken
by the Commissioner because the original determination and practice re-
sulting therefrom was no longer the most favorable to the government.
This was answered by the court as follows:
"... granting ... that the Bureau's willingness to leave un-
disturbed the practice [originally required] was induced by the
larger tax accruing to the government, such action, or lack of
action cannot estop the government now from insisting upon
compliance with the laws."' 5
The full effect of such a holding was brought out in the opinion, in
answer to another asserted defense of the taxpayer:
"It is also said, and doubtless it is true, that during some of
those years-perhaps all of them-the method of computing in-
come now insisted on by the Commissioner, if then applied, would
have resulted in a smaller tax ...
done 'wherever, in good conscience and honest dealing' a party ought not to be
permitted to repudiate his previous statements... " Robbins v. United States, 21
F. Supp. 403 (Ct. C1. 1937). Since the taxpayer is merely having to pay what he
lawfully owes (Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 863 (8th Cir.
1944)), there is no "wrong being done." Cf. Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F.
2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
s' See page 367 and notes 57-62 supra.
83 F. 2d 317 (D. C. Cir.) aff'd, 299 U. S. 171 (1936).
Id. at 320.
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[Also] ". petitioners might have altogether avoided the
tax now assessed ... and it is likely that they would have done
so but for their reliance upon the repeated approval of the other
method by the Bureau; but even this can not help them if
the old interpretation of the regulation by the Bureau was
wrong ....86
The recognition by the court that the method now asserted would
result in a lower tax to the taxpayer, if applied retroactively, was of
little assistance to the taxpayer. By the time the opinion was rendered,
the statutory time for filing a claim for refund had expired. This would
be true in the vast majority of cases of this nature. Also, the fact that
he could have so acted as to avoid liability for the tax is of little assist-
ance, for the transactions are now completed and he cannot "re-do"
them. In spite of the inequities often resulting in cases of this sort,
the Schafer case represents the unanimous view of the courts today.
87
Inconsistent Determinations by the Commissioner
Sometimes, the determination of a particular fact or a ruling on a
particular transaction will be projected into another year, where the
sane fact or transaction must govern tax liability. For example, a
taxpayer realizes a gain on an exchange of property. In reviewing the
return, the Commissioner increases the valuation of the property received
and the taxpayer pays the tax on the additional gain resulting from this
redetermination. In some future year, if the taxpayer sells the prop-
erty, he will have to look to the value as determined upon acquisition
in order to arrive at his basis for gain or loss on the sale. A serious
difficulty might arise if the Commissioner refuses to recognize the prior
valuation, and asserts a lower value as having been the correct value
at acquisition.88 This, of course, would increase the taxable gain or
"Id.
8, Niles Bennet Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 357 (1929) ; Keystone
Auto Club v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1950); Hotel Kingkade v.
Commissioner, 180 F. 2d 310 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Commissioner v. Rowan Drilling
Co., 130 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942); Detroit & Winsor Ferry Co. v. Woodworth,
115 F. 2d 795 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Sharpe v. Commissioner, 107 F. 2d 13 (3rd Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 665 (1940) ; William Hardy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82
F. 2d 249 (2d Cir. 1936); Seeley v. Helvering, 77 F. 2d 323 (2d Cir. 1935);
Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 938 (2d Cir. 1935); Nichols
Land Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 437 (8th Cir. 1933); Elrod Slug Casting
Machine Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915 (D. Neb. 1944); South Chester Tube
Co., 14 T. C. 1229, 1235 (1950) ; Southern Maryland Agricultural Fair Ass'n, 40
B. T. A. 549 (1939); 10A MFRTENs, LAW oF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION §60.14
(Rev. vol. 1948).
" This is essentially the fact situation presented in J. 0. Cole, Ex'r, 13 B. T. A.
1310 (1928), where the Commissioner, for the purpose of determining gain upon
acquisition of certain bonds acquired by the taxpayer, used the par value of the
bonds. Later, when the bonds were sold at a loss, the Commissioner successfully
asserted that the basis for determination of the loss was the inarket value at the
date of acquisition, which value was less than the par value. See Alamo Nat.
Bank v. Commissioner, 95 F. 2d 622 (5th Cir. 1938) (the court discusses this
possibility). For cases involving similar situations, see note 97 ifra. See also,
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reduce the loss which was realized on the sale. If the statute of limita-
tions has not intervened to bar a reassessment of, or an amendment to,
the prior return there is no question but what the Commissioner might
redetermine the value upon acquisition. 89 And the gain on the original
transaction will be reduced as the gain on the subsequent transaction is
increased, so that no serious inequities are likely to result. If the
statute has intervened between the year of acquisition and the year of
sale, the inequity that might result from a redetermination of the value
at acquisition is obvious. The gain on the sale would be determined
from a low evaluation of the property sold, and the gain on acquisition
would have already been taxed on the gain determined by a high
evaluation of the same property.
A situation of this nature might come about in two different ways.
In several sections of the Code, the Commissioner is given a choice of
methods which he may require a taxpayer to follow in respect of a
particular transaction.0 0 Thus, either method that might be required
is legal. On the other hand, the case might be one in which there is
only one correct way to handle the particular transaction. Any other
way would then be "illegal." Therefore, when the Commissioner makes
such a determination, it must be ascertained whether he has statutory
authority to require one of several methods, or, whether he is merely
making the determination under his own interpretation of the statute.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking as Circuit Justice for the First Cir-
cuit, pointed out the distinction between the doctrines applicable in these
two situations, which are correctly labeled "election" and "estoppel":
"[Election] is applicable where a taxpayer has had a choice
of two methods of computing his tax, both legal .... Estoppel,
on the other hand, applies where there was only one lawful
course open, which was not followed ... by the taxpayer. . .."-1
While the above statement was made in a case involving an asserted
estoppel against a taxpayer, it would seem to apply to the Commissioner
as well. Unfortunately, however, the cases do not always make a dis-
tinction between the doctrine of election and that of estoppel.° 2  Such
Maguire, Surrey, and Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 48 YALE
L. J. 509, 511 (1939) ; Note, 52 HARv. L. REv. 300 (1938).
89 See notes 74-78 supra. United States v. La Societe Francaise D. B. M.,
152 F. 2d 243 (9th Cir. 1945). This statement is qualified by the Sixth Circuit
holdings, discussed at note 75 supra.
" See e.g., INT. REv. CODE §§22(c), 22(d) (5) (A) and (B) (dealing with in-
ventories) ; 45 (dealing with related businesses). Cf. §22(d) (6) (D). See gen-
erally, Magill, The Finality of Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenute, 28 CoL. L. REv.,536, 564-65 (1928).
"Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483, 493 (1st Cir. 1948).
92 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Mellon, 184 F. 2d 157 (3rd Cir. 1950) ; Vestal v.
Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 132 (D. C. Cir. 1945); Alamo Nat. Bank v. Commis-
sioner, 95 F. 2d 622 (5th Cir. 1938).
(Vol. 30
19521 APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE ESTOPPEL 377
a distinction is important, for some courts attach different legal conse-
quences to the two situations.93  In order for the doctrine of election
to be applicable, there must be a specific Code provision or regulation
for the alternative method or methods0 4  Where such provision is
made, giving to the Commissioner the right to require one of several
methods, he would seem to be bound by the election made thereunder. 5
However, where the original method of computation required by the
Commissioner is illegal, the problem is simply one of the application of
an estoppel. In such cases, the taxpayer is frequently estopped if he
chose the original method of handling the transaction, 96 but only a few
cases estop the government where the Commissioner required the orig-
inal method. 7 These few cases are most important, however, for they
" See notes 95 and 97 infra.
" Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948); Commissioner v.
Arnold, 147 F. 2d 23 (1st Cir. 1945); 10A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §60.17 (Rev. vol. 1948 and Cune. Supp. 1951).
" See 10A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §60.17 (Rev. vol.
1948). Cf. Ross v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1942).
" See Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal
Taxation, 48 HAxv. L. REv. 1281, 1285-93 (1935).
"' Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 132 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Commissioner v.
McLean, 127 F. 2d 942 (5th Cir. 1942); Dixie Margerine Co. v. Commissioner,
115 F. 2d 445 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Eichelberger & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. 2d 874
(5th Cir. 1937) ; Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1935) ;
and see Howell v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 316 (5th Cir. 1945) semble. Cf.
Wurtsbaugh v. Commissioner, 187 F. 2d 975 (5th Cir. 1951); H. S. D. Co. v.
Commissioner, 191 F. 2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951), discussed in note 75 supra. See
also Ernest Strong, 7 T. C. 953 (1946), where the court refused to allow the
Commissioner to assert that certain gifts were valid and complete for purposes of
the gift tax when he had, in a former action, won an income tax assessment
case on the ground that the same trusts were not valid gifts. Accord, United
States v. Brown, 86 F. 2d 798 (6th Cir. 1936). See Karol, The Doctrine of Estoppel,
23 TAXES 1132 (1945). The Strong case did not involve a situation caused by
inconsistent provisions of the income and gift taxes. There are some situations
where facts similar to those presented in Ernest Strong could be caused by dif-
ferent requirements of the income and gift tax provisions. Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U. S. 331 (1940) was such a case. There, a trust was set up in such a
manner as to constitute a taxable gift to the donor. However, under the pro-
visions of the income tax, the income of the trust, even though not payable to
him, was taxable to the donor. This problem, with a suggested solution, is dis-
cussed in Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate, and Gift
Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HAv. L. Ray.
337 (1942); Platt, Integration and Correlation--The Treasury Proposal, 3 TAX
L. REv. 59 (1947); Wales, Consistency it Taxes-The Rationale of Integration
and Correlation, 3 TAX L. REv. 173 (1947); Griswold, Coordinating Federal In-
come, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 22 TAXES 6 (1944).
The following cases have refused to estop the Commissioner from taking an
inconsistent position, even though inequities might result. Gaylord v. Commis-
sioner, 153 F. 2d 408 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Lembcke v. Commissioner, 126 F. 2d 940
(2d Cir. 1942); Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Latchum, 44 F. Supp. 436 (D. Del.),
aff'd per curiam, 131 F. 2d 1023 (1942) ; United States Trust Co. of New York,
13 B. T. A. 1074 (1928); Ross v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1942)
where the court distinguished between the Commissioner hinself taking an in-
consistent position, and the Commissioner taking a position inconsistent with that
of a revenue agent. Compare with this the situation where different represent-
atives of the government are involved in suits against the same taxpayer over
the same issue decided in a former year. Note 9 supra. In some cases, the Coin-
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firmly establish the principle that the government can be estopped in a
tax case. Relying upon a "duty of consistency" which is said to be
"akin to estoppel" these cases have refused to allow the Commissioner
to correct a former erroneous ruling where the result would be in-
equitable. This "duty of consistency" has been criticized because "it
does not do equity unless supplemented by what in the end comes to a
reassessment of the first tax in violation of the statute of limitations."0 8
This may be true in certain cases,99 but in the vast majority of cases
where the Commissioner is permitted to take an inconsistent position the
resulting inequity far outweighs this factor. For example, in United
States Trust Co. v. Commissioner,1° ° the Commissioner disallowed a
deduction in 1920 and required that it be taken the following year.
After the statute of limitations for 1920 had expired, the Commissioner
disallowed the deduction for 1921 and ruled that 1920 had been the
correct year for the deduction. Thus, the taxpayer was unable to take
the deduction in either year. Another striking example of the inequities
which might result from the Commissioner taking an inconsistent posi-
tion is Gaylord v. Commissioner.'0 l There the taxpayer made a gift
and paid the gift tax thereon; later, after the statute of limitations had
run on the year of the gift, the Commissioner ruled that the income
derived from the gift was still taxable to the donor. The taxpayer
could do nothing about the gift tax paid, and also was required to pay
the income tax. Fortunately, all of the courts do not follow such harsh
rules, and each of the two cases mentioned above have their counter-
parts in other cases where the courts have refused to allow the Com-
missioner to act as he did in those cases.1
0 2
missioner has been allowed to tax the same income to two persons. Emery v.
Commissioner, 78 F. 2d 437 (1st Cir. 1935) ("Doubtless the Commissioner will
make a fair adjustment ... " Doubtlessf) ; Elizabeth W. Boykin, 16 B. T. A. 477
(1929) ; Okonite Co. v. Commissioner, 155 F. 2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1946) (acceptance
of tax from stockholders on a corporate dividend; denial to the corporation that
it was a taxable dividend).
Cf. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U. S. 296 (1946), and
Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935), both noted in 94 U. PA. L. REv. 343
(1946), involving the doctrine of equitable recoupment. This is another method
used by the courts to alleviate hardships caused by the statute of limitations. See
generally, Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax Cases, 3 TAX L. REv. 71
(1947) ; McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoupment ins Federal Taxation, 28 VA. L.
REv. 577 (1942).
" Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483, 494 (1948). This, of course, pre-
supposes that there is some basic "wrong" in violating the statute of limitations
to prevent an inequity. Congress has seen fit to do this very thing. See INT.
RaV. CODE §3801, discussed at page 379.
" This will follow only if the whole transaction is recomputed (see page 379
for the operation of a recomputation under section 3801 of the Code). No such
consequences followed in the cases cited in the first paragraph of note 97 mtpra.
100 13 B. T. A. 1074 (1928).
101 153 F. 2d 408 (9th Cir. 1946). This case was not based upon conflicting
gift and income tax provisions. See the discussion of Ernest Strong, 7 T. C.
953 (1946) at note 97 mpra.
... Joseph Richelberger & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. 2d 874, 875 (5th Cir.
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Congress has recognized the inequities that may result from a change
in position after the statute of limitations has run and has provided for
adjustments in certain types of cases.1 3  This provision is remedial in
nature, and its purpose has been explained as follows:
"That section is a relief provision and was enacted to relieve
both taxpayers and the Government from the unjust effects, in
certain cases, resulting from the correction of errors where the
operation of other provisions of the revenue laws ordinarily pre-
cludes correction of tax results .. . flowing from an erroneously
inconsistent position previously maintained (that is, for other
years) by either or both parties.
10 4
In the cases where applicable, the adjustment is made as follows:
"... the tax for the year with respect to which the error was
made is determined, the error is then corrected, and the differ-
ence between the corrected tax result and the first figure con-
stitutes the amount of the adjustment...."
". .. if the amount is an increase over the tax previously
determined, it is recovered in the same manner as a deficiency
determined by the Commissioner; if a decrease in that tax, in
the same manner as an overpayment claimed by the taxpayer."'10 5
However, the adjustment provision does not carry out fully the
recommendation of the subcommittee that the "statute ,of limitations...
be so adjusted as to insure the taxation of income, and the allowance
of deductions, in the year to which properly applicable."'106 For no
clearly apparent reason the statute does not provide for adjustment in
cases where deductions are not taken in the proper year, which was the
1937). On quite similar facts the court held contra to United States Trust Co.,
stating that "The United States got the benefit of his [the Commissioner] decision
then and ought to abide by it now." And, in Ernest Strong, 7 T. C. 953 (1946)
the court reached a result contrary to that in the Gaylord case. However, the
Strong case was decided upon the principle of res judicata, as there had been a
former decision on the question of whether the gift to the trust was a valid one.
In the former; case, the court had held the gift valid, and a gift tax had been
paid. This case was held to preclude the Commissioner from now assessing an
income tax to the grantor of the trust. While the court discussed the principles
of res judicata, the question was actually one of collateral estoppel. See page 358
and note 8 supra. It is doubtful if the doctrine of collateral estoppel was
applicable in that case. See page 359 for the limitations upon the operation of the
doctrine. See also, Commissioner v. McLean, 127 F. 2d 942 (5th Cir. 1942).
"03 INT. Ray. CODE §3801. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 820 of
the Revenue Act of 1938, 48 YAaE L. J. 509 and 719 (1939) ; Note, 52 HAgv. L.
REv. 300 (1938); Legis., 39 COL. L. REv. 460 (1939).
... Gooch Milling and Elevator Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 94, 97 (Ct.
Cl. 1948). See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act
of 1938, 48 YALE L. J. 509 and 719 at 719 (1939) ; Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel
in Tax Cases, 3 TAx L. REv. 71, 83 (1947).
10. Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 48
YALE L. J. 509 and 719, 740 (first quoted paragraph) and 746 (second paragraph).
This is approximately the same language as contained in T. D. 4856, 34 TaaAs.
DEC. INT. REv. 414 (1938).
.0. Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means on a Pro-
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situation presented in the United States Trust Co. case.' 0 7 Also, the
statute pertains only to income taxes, and therefore, does not include
such situations as occurred in Gaylord v. Commissioner. In spite of
the fact that it does not cover all cases where inequity results from a
change of position after the statute of limitations has expired, the
statute does prevent many inequities.' 08 However, it must be remem-
bered that the adjustment statute does not prevent the Commissioner
from taking an inconsistent position, it merely mitigates some of the
consequences which would otherwise result from this inconsistency.,0
Of all of the types of representations that might be made to a tax-
payer, the one not yet mentioned is the one' most frequently occurring
in the day to day administration of the revenue laws-the "horseback"
opinion of a minor revenue agent. These are the men with whom the
average citizen comes in contact; these are the men upon whose advice
the average citizen relies. But needless to say, in the light of the fore-
going discussion, the representations of these lesser Bureau agents are
so much "chaff in the wind" as a basis for an estoppel. 1 0
IV. EXISTING AND SUGGESTED REMEDIES FOR THE PROBLEM
The taxpayer who contemplates some business venture, but who, in
view of the possible tax consequences would like to have a binding ad-
vance ruling upon the consequences of his act, might well throw his
hands up in resignation. One writer has described the position of the
Bureau with respect to this taxpayer as being analogous to the fol-
lowing:
posed Revision of the Revenue Laws, H. R. 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) 79,
recommendation No. 48. (Emphasis added.)
10 See Note, 52 H.Av. L. REv. 300, 304 (1938) which suggests some of the
reasons why such a provision might have been omitted.
"'Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 48
YALE L. J. 509 and 719, 734 (1939). The courts have tended to restrict its
operation, however. See e.g., Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. United
States, 163 F. 2d 60 (2d Cir. 1947), reversing, 67 F. Supp. 920 (S. D. N. Y.
1946).
10" Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 48
YALE L. J. 509 and 719; Note, 52 HAgv. L. Ra,. 300 (1938).
110 Commissioner v. Duckwitz, 68 F. 2d 629, 630 (7th Cir. 1934) where advice
was given to a taxpayer by a Solicitor in the Bureau of Internal Revenue that a
certain business was a partnership and not a corporation. The Court of Appeals
stated: "The Board properly rejected ... respondent's contention . . . [concern-
ing] estoppel of the government because of careless and unofficial expression of
opinion by the Solicitor .... The ruling of the Board [is] so obviously sound
that we refrain from discussing [it] in; detail." (Emphasis added) Walker Hill
Co. v. United States, 162 F. 2d 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 771 (1947) ;
Barnett Investment Co. v. Nee, 72 F. Supp. 81 (W. D. Mo. 1947), both of these
cases are discussed in Note, Reliance on Advice of Government Officials, 33 COR-
NELL L. Q. 607 (1948); Chicago Flag & Decorating Co. v. United States, 119 F.
2d 413 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Darling v. Commissioner, 49 F. 2d 111 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 283 U. S. 866 (1931); Ritter v. United States, 28 F. 2d 265 (3rd Cir.
1928) ; Searles' Real Estate Trust, 25 B. T. A. 1115 (1932).
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"... a young man broached marriage to a young woman in
this fashion, 'Buy your trousseau, send out the invitations, arrange
for the honeymoon, meet me at the altar, and I will tell you then
whether I will marry you.' "11
But what can the taxpayer do? He can get a ruling only in very
limited types of situations, and even if he gets the ruling, he can never
be absolutely sure that the Bureau will uphold it. The fact that the
Bureau upholds the vast najority of these rulings,1 2 is of little value
to the taxpayer when it is realized that such ruling is not legally bind-
ing. In any event, Bureau personnel may or may not choose to upset
his ruling if it later develops that it was erroneous.
The possibility of obtaining a closing agreement is open to the tax-
payer seeking a determination of the tax consequences of a particular
transaction. L3  These agreements may pertain to completed transactions
or to future transactions." 4 If pertaining to a future transaction, such
an agreement is "subject to any change in or modification of the law
'nacted subsequent to the date of the agreement and applicable to such
taxable period."'115 But if there is no such change in the applicable law,
the agreement is binding upon the government and the taxpayer except
upon a showing of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a mate-
rial fact." 6 However, such agreements are difficult to obtain, and must
be approved by the Secretary, the Under Secretary or an Assistant Sec-
retary of the Treasury.1 7 If the agreement sought pertains only to a
completed tax period, it is somewhat less difficult to obtain, requiring
only the approval of the Commissioner." l8 Also, a closing agreement
pertaining to past transactions is not affected by changes in the law
under which it was made. Thus, if Congress subsequently enacts retro-
111 Herman Oliphant, Declaratory Rulings, 24 A. B. A. J. 7, 8 (1938).
""See Wenchel, Taxpayer's Rulings, 5 TAx L. REv. 105, 113-14 (1950).
21'INT. REv. CODE §3760. See Wenchel, Taxpayer's Rulings, 5 TAx L. REv.
105, 117 (1950); Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax Cases, 3 TAx L. Rnv.
71, 81 (1947).
"l, Paragraph A, Section 801 (Title V-Miscellaneous Provisions) of the Rev-
enue Act of 1938, amended what is now INT. REv. CoDE §3760, by striking out
the words "ending prior to the date of the agreement," which had theretofore
limited the operation of the section to completed transactions. Act, May 28, 1938,
c. 289 §801, 52 STAT. 573 (1938). See T. D. 4855, 1938-2 Cum. BULL. 252. See
also, Cramp Shipbuilding Co., 14 T. C. 33 (1950) (involved a closing agreement
applicable to future years)."S T. D. 4855, 1938 Cum. BuLL. 252.
lie INT. REv. CODE §3760(b).
227Id.
"' Under the authority vested in him by Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 1950
(15 Fma. REa. 4935 (1950)), the Secretary of the Treasury has given to the
Commissioner all the rights and duties wtih respect to closing agreements relating
to the tax liability of only past periods. Thus, no approval by the Secretary, the
Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary is necessary in such a case. Mim.
6772 (March 3, 1952).
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active legislation favorable to the taxpayer,"0 or if the statute under
which the tax was agreed to is subsequently declared unconstitutional
the agreement precludes the taxpayer from taking advantage of this
change.12 0  Also, if the Commissioner subsequently requires an incon-
sistent method for computation of the tax liability for a later year,
even if based upon the transaction involved in the closing agreement,
the agreement will not preclude him from so acting.'1
2
The possibility of a binding advance ruling by the Commissioner has
been suggested. These rulings, termed "declaratory rulings," would
have some similarity to a taxpayer's ruling as rendered today, but they
would have the binding effect of a closing agreement. A House sub-
committee in 1938 recommended that the Commissioner be given author-
ity to make such rulings, but the recommendation was not enacted into
law. Rather, Congress amended the section on closing agreements,
allowing them to be made as to future transactions. 122  The mechanics
of the two operate somewhat differently, and the procedure for obtaining
a dosing agreement is a great deal more cumbersome than that of the
proposed "declaratory ruling."'
23
As pointed out, the closing agreement offers one possible solution for
the taxpayer who wishes to have a final determination of his tax liability
for past or future years. Another solution could be provided if Con-
gress would follow the provisions of certain other Acts124 and allow the
119 Guggenheim v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 186 (Ct. Cl. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U. S. 908, rehearing denied, 336 U. S. 911 (1949).
120 Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 9 F. Supp. 36 (D. Ohio 1934);
Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. United States, 42 F. 2d 313 (Ct. Cl. 1930).
121 Smith Paper Co., 31 B. T. A. 28 (1934), aff'd sub norn, Export Leaf
Tobacco Co. v. Commissioner, 78 F. 2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 627
(1935). Such a case would not seem to form a sound basis for the application
of a "duty of consistency" (see page 378), on the part of the Commissioner. The
taxpayer has been instrumental in binding himself, and would not seem to be in
a position to seek to have the agreement extended to any year not expressly
covered. Such agreements may constitute a "determination" within the meaning
of §3801 of the Code. Thus, such an agreement may form the basis for an adjust-
ment under the provisions of that section (see page 379 and supporting notes).
INT. Rav. CODE §3801 (a) (1) (A). U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.3801 (a) (1)-2.
12 Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means on a Pro-
posed Revision of the Revenue Laws, H. R. 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) 79,
recommendation No. 49 (recommended authority for declaratory rulings with
binding effect). For the amendment to the section on closing agreements that
was actually enacted, see note 115 supra. The author's discussions with members
of the government who were present when this proposal was made lead to the
conclusion that the Bureau, on second thought, decided that it did not want the
power to make declaratory rulings. The opinion seems to have been that such
power might make the Bureau a giant "legal aid" clinic for taxpayers and their
counsel. Staffing such an organization would be an almost impossible task.
122 For a discussion of the mechanics of the declaratory ruling, see Herman
Oliphant, Declaratory Rulings, 24 A. B. A. J. 7 (1938) ; Traynor, Declaratory
Rulings, 16 TAx MAG. 195 (1938).
12' The Securities and Exchange Act §209(b), 53 STAT. 1173 (1939), 15 U. S.
C. A. §77 sss (c) (1951) : "No provision of this subchapter imposing any liabil-
ity shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any
rule, regulation, or order of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule, regu-
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taxpayer who relies in good faith upon the representations of a govern-
ment agent to set up these representations as a defense on that par-
ticular matter. However, a better solution to the complex problem
presented by the reliance of citizens upon representations or interpre-
tations by various government agents or by the courts, would seem to
be in the bands of the courts. The courts are well suited to appraise
and permit equitable defenses in cases such as those discussed herein.
They can weigh the asserted right of the citizen to expect that his gov-
ernment will "always be a gentleman"' 25 against the obvious need of
the government for an efficient and impartial administration of the rev-
enue laws. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a satis-
factory -balance between these two conflicting concepts by way of a
statute.126  The Stockstrom case, where the taxpayer relied upon the
interpretation by the courts, the actions and representations of the
Bureau, and the apparent acceptance by Congress of the same interpre-
tation, represents an excellent use of an equitable defense to prevent
a patent injustice. The majority of the court felt that "taxpayers expect,
and are entitled to receive, ordinary fair play from tax officials.'
2 7 It
is difficult to see how such a doctrine could to any appreciable extent
disrupt the collection of revenue by the government.
lation, or order may, after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be
determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason."
See also, The Portal-to-Portal Act, §§9, 10, 61 STAT. 84 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§251 et seq. (Supp. III, 19, 50) and the discussion of the operation of these
sections in LIVENGOoD, TaE FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW 10, 23 (1951). This
act contains a provision similar to that of the Securities and Exchange Act quoted
above.
Even one of the Revenue Acts, at one time, allowed reliance upon adminis-
trative rulings to prevent liability for a tax. Revenue Act of 1926 §1108(b), 44
STAT. 114 (1927) : "No tax shall be levied, assessed, or collected under the pro-
visions of Title VI of this Act [excise taxes] on any article . . .if at the time
of the sale or lease there was an existing ruling, regulation or Treasury Decision
holding that the sale or lease of such article was not taxable, and the . . . [tax-
payer] parted with possession or ownership of such article, relying upon the
ruling, regulation, or Treasury Decision."
"', Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 283, 289 (1951).
"The conflicting policies throughout the field are those of the necessity on the
part of the government of collecting taxes as expeditiously as possible and of
accurate and thoroughgoing statutory enforcement. Then too, there is the danger
that the government might be estopped by the hasty curb-stone opinions of its
tax officers in regard to a person's tax liability when the opinions subsequently
turn out to be erroneous. . . . Lastly, there is the consideration that the personnel
of the department is ever changing, and proof of the actual transactions would be
difficult." Note, Reliance on Advice of Government Officials, 33 CORNELL L. Q.
607, 613 (1948).
12 See Proceedings of the Seventh Tax- Clinic of the American. Bar Asso-
ciation, 16 TAX MAG. 663, 694 (1938). Mr. Randolph Paul stated: "I do want
to emphasize the seriousness of the subject, and I don't believe that the cure can
be effected through the operation of the estoppel principle. I tried myself to deal
with the estoppel one time and I ran into sixty or seventy pages on the subject
and I don't believe we are going to be able to put that into a comprehensible
statute."127 190 F. 2d at 289.
